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FOREWORD
Several years ago, as the primary focus of U.S.
military strategy shifted to the western Pacific region, many respected authorities began to question
the relevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in modern world events. More recent
events, such as the Russian Federation’s annexation
of Crimea, have given policy makers pause to question the wisdom of anticipated force cuts in Europe.
Amidst this turmoil, the staffs of U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe have been establishing
and refining their capabilities to conduct military
operations in and through the cyberspace realm.
If indeed the decision is made to pursue military
action in cyberspace, what capabilities are available
within NATO forces to accomplish such activities?
What organization, doctrine, and methods would
guide operators who perform such actions? In this
monograph, Mr. Jeffrey Caton explores these questions within the broader context of the continued
evolution of the NATO Alliance. He argues that the
overall state of cyberspace activities within NATO appears to be sound and that continued resourcing for,
and pursuit of, improved cyberspace capabilities by
U.S. military forces in Europe will help to ensure the
steady progress of NATO cyberspace endeavors.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The development of cyberspace defense capabilities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has been making steady progress since its formal introduction at the North Atlantic Council Prague
Summit in 2002. Bolstered by numerous cyber attacks
such as those in Estonia in 2007, Alliance priorities
were formalized in subsequent NATO cyber defense
policies that were adopted in 2008, 2011, and 2014.
This monograph examines the past and current state
of NATO's cyberspace defense efforts by assessing the
appropriateness and sufficiency of them to address
anticipated threats to member countries, including the
United States. This analysis focuses on the recent history of NATO’s cyberspace defense efforts and how
changes in NATO’s strategy and policy writ large embrace the emerging nature of cyberspace for military
forces, as well as other elements of power. In general,
the topics presented herein are well documented in
many sources. Thus, this monograph serves as a primer for current and future operations and provides senior policymakers, decision-makers, military leaders,
and their respective staffs with an overall appreciation of existing capabilities as well as the challenges,
opportunities, and risks associated with cyberspacerelated operations in the NATO context. The scope
of this discussion is limited to unclassified and open
source information; any classified discussion must
occur within another venue.
This monograph has three main sections:
• NATO Cyberspace Capability: Strategy and
Policy. This section examines the evolution of
the strategic foundations of NATO cyber activities, policies, and governance as they evolved
over the past 13 years. It analyzes the content of
xi

the summit meetings of the NATO North Atlantic Council for material related to cyber defense.
It also summarizes the evolution of NATO
formal cyber defense policy and governance
since 2002.
• NATO Cyberspace Capability: Military Focus.
NATO cyber defense mission areas include
NATO network protection, shared situational
awareness in cyberspace, critical infrastructure
protection (CIP), counter-terrorism, support to
member country cyber capability development,
and response to crises related to cyberspace.
This section explores these mission areas by
examining the operations and planning, doctrine and methods, and training and exercises
related to NATO military cyberspace activities.
• Key Issues for Current Policy. The new Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy affirms the role
that NATO cyber defense contributes to the
mission of collective defense and embraces
the notion that a cyber attack may lead to
the invocation of Article 5 actions for the Alliance. Against this backdrop, this section examines the related issues of offensive cyberspace, deterrence in and through cyberspace,
legal considerations, and cooperation with the
European Union.
This monograph concludes with a summary of the
main findings from the discussion of NATO cyberspace capabilities and a brief examination of the implications for Department of Defense and Army forces
in Europe. Please note that the European spelling of
some words (e.g., defence) may be used throughout
this monograph to ensure the accuracy of NATO
organizational and operational titles.
xii
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NATO CYBERSPACE CAPABILITY:
A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
EVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
The development of cyberspace defense capabilities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has been making steady progress since its formal introduction at the North Atlantic Council Prague
Summit in 2002. Bolstered by numerous cyber attacks
such as those in Estonia in 2007, Alliance priorities
were formalized in subsequent NATO cyber policies
that were adopted in 2008, 2011, and 2014. This monograph examines the past and current state of NATO‘s
cyberspace defense efforts by assessing the appropriateness and sufficiency of them to address anticipated
threats to member countries, including the United
States. This analysis focuses on the recent history of
NATO's cyberspace defense efforts, and how changes
in NATO's strategy and policy writ large embrace the
emerging nature of cyberspace for military forces as
well as other elements of power. In general, the topics
presented herein are well documented in many sources. Thus this monograph serves as a primer for current
and future operations to provide senior policymakers,
decision-makers, military leaders, and their respective
staffs with an overall appreciation of existing capabilities as well as the challenges, opportunities, and risks
associated with cyberspace-related operations in the
NATO context.
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NATO CYBERSPACE CAPABILITY:
STRATEGY AND POLICY
The founding principles of NATO were the collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative
security amongst its member countries. Conceived in
a Cold War environment, the Alliance has endured
strategic changes through major conflicts and the
global power shifts that eventually led to the fall of
the Warsaw Pact. After a brief period where some
pundits questioned its relevancy, NATO has experienced a renaissance of its core security functions with
the adoption of a new Strategic Concept in 2010. This
section examines the recent evolution of the strategic
foundations of NATO cyber activities, policies, and
governance as they evolved over the past 13 years.
Cyberspace Addressed in Major Accords.
The 2002 NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC)
Summit in Prague, Czech Republic marked the entry
of cyber defense as a significant issue worthy of the
collective attention of the Alliance.1 Leaders at the
summit directed the creation of a technical NATO cyber defense program that included the establishment
of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
(NCIRC).2
While work on cyber defense progressed, there
was no mention of it in a NAC summit again until the
2006 meeting in Riga, Latvia. Table 1 summarizes the
key strategic-level content from NATO summit meetings held over the past decade (see the Appendix for
the verbatim excerpts of cyber-related content from
these meetings).
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NATO North
Atlantic Council
Summit Meeting

Key Strategic Cyberspace-Related Issues
in Summit Declaration

Riga, Latvia
November 29,
2006

• Endorsed work to develop a NATO Network
Enabled Capability to share information in
Alliance operations and improve protection
against cyber attack.3

Bucharest,
Hungary
April 3, 2008

• Adopted an initial Policy on Cyber Defense
and development of supporting structures and
authorities to implement it.4
• Established a NATO Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA).

Strasbourg-Kehl,
France/Germany
April 2-3, 2009

• Improved the existing Computer Incident
Response Capability.
• Activated the Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Estonia.5
• Called for an updated NATO in-depth cyber
defense policy by June 2011 as well as a
supporting action plan.
• Accelerated goal of NATO Computer Incident
Response Capability (NCIRC) to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012.

Lisbon, Portugal
November 20,
2010

• Called for all NATO bodies to be under centralized cyber protection.
• Use NATO’s defense planning processes to
develop Allies’ cyber defense capabilities and
improve interoperability.
• Work closely with other actors, such as the
United Nations (UN) and the European Union
(EU).6

Table 1. Key Cyber Issues at Recent NATO
North Atlantic Council Summit Meetings.
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NATO North
Atlantic Council
Summit Meeting

Key Strategic Cyberspace-Related Issues
in Summit Declaration
• Confirmed adoption of a new Cyber Defence
Concept, Policy, and Action Plan.

Chicago, Illinois,
USA
May 20, 2012

• Reiterated efforts to improve NATO capabilities and planning to address cyber attacks by
continuing to pursue centralized cyber protection of NATO bodies; integrate cyber defense
into Alliance structures and procedures and
strengthen Alliance collaboration and interoperability.7
• Endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy.

Newport, Wales,
UK
September 5, 2014

• Reaffirmed ongoing efforts to improve NATO
capabilities and planning to address cyber
attacks through new initiatives with industry;
with cyber defense education, training, and
exercise activities; and with a cyber range
capability.8

Table 1. Key Cyber Issues at Recent NATO
North Atlantic Council Summit Meetings. (cont.)
The 2009 Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly included a report, “NATO and Cyber
Defence,” that provided an in-depth review of the key
issues faced by the Alliance in the cyberspace realm.
The report’s conclusion characterized the urgent need
for NATO cyber defense:
All indications signal that cyber attacks are now one of
the most serious asymmetric threats faced by the Alliance and its member states, along with terrorism and
nuclear proliferation. The open nature of the Internet
makes preventing cyber attacks difficult; effective
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international cooperation will be critical to addressing
this problem in the years to come. As the world’s premier collective defence entity, NATO has a responsibility to take adequate measures to protect itself from
such threats, as well as having a potentially significant
role to play in contributing to the cyber defence of its
Members, both through deterrence and by coordinating common cyber security measures. NATO’s new
strategic concept should reflect this important new element of Alliance activity. National parliamentarians
have an important role to play in hastening the implementation of NATO’s cyber defence policy, as well as
ensuring that cyber security measures are responsibly
put in place and exercised at the domestic level.9

A significant outcome of the 2010 Lisbon Summit
was the adoption of a new NATO Strategic Concept:
“Active Engagement, Modern Defence.”10 This official
document describes NATO’s enduring purpose, fundamental security tasks, and anticipated security environment. It also provides guidance on how military
forces should adapt to implement the new concept.
There have been only six previous Strategic Concepts,
the first four of which were classified documents that
reflected the evolution of NATO throughout the Cold
War and addressed issues such as the doctrines of
massive retaliation and flexible response for nuclear
weapons. Strategic Concepts in 1991 and 1999 addressed the emerging challenges of a post-Cold War
geopolitical environment.11
“Active Engagement, Modern Defence” is focused
on three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis
management, and cooperative security.12 Its section
describing “The Security Environment” includes a
paragraph that states, “cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly
in damage” to governments and industries in the
5

alliance. It also notes that such attacks may not only
come from foreign militaries, but also from “organized criminals, terrorists and/or extremist groups.”13
The Strategic Concept’s section on “Defence and Deterrence” outlines the scope of military capabilities
required by NATO to cope with challenges such as
nuclear operations, ballistic missile defense, expeditionary operations, counter-terrorism measures, and
energy security. It also explicitly mentions the broad
areas of capability required to confront cyber attacks:
We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any
threat to the safety and security of our populations.
Therefore, we will…develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyberattacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence
capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO
cyber awareness, warning and response with member
nations.14

Cyber Policy and Governance.
An initial NATO Cyber Defence Policy was adopted at the 2008 NATO NAC Summit in Bucharest. The
policy was then updated after the 2010 Lisbon Summit and again after the 2014 Wales Summit. Table 2
summarizes the key tenets of each of these policies.
The 2008 version provided some of the foundational
elements for future policies and began the process of
centralizing NATO cyber efforts through institutions
such as the Cyber Defence Management Authority
(CDMA). The CDMA mission was “to initiate and coordinate cyber defenses, review capabilities, and conduct appropriate risk management.”15
6

The 2011 NATO Cyber Defence Policy followed
the adoption of the new NATO Strategic Concept and
thus focused on methods to further NATO’s collective
ability “to prevent, detect, defend against and recover
from cyber-attacks.”16 It also established a cyber defense governance with a hierarchy that flowed from
the NAC to the Defence Policy and Planning Committee in Reinforced Format, then to the NATO Cyber
Defence Management Board (CDMB), and finally to
the NCIRC.17
Year
2008

Key Tenets of NATO Cyber Policy
• Emphasize protection of key information systems.
• Share best practices for cyber defence.
• Develop capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to
counter cyber attack.
• Develop NATO’s cyber defence capabilities.
• Strengthen linkage between NATO and national authorities.18

2011

• Integrate cyber defence considerations into NATO structures
and planning processes in order to perform NATO’s core tasks
of collective defence and crisis management.
• Focus on prevention, resilience, and defence of critical cyber
assets to NATO and Allies.
• Develop robust cyber defence capabilities and centralize protection of NATO’s own networks.
• Develop minimum requirements for cyber defence of national
networks critical to NATO’s core tasks.
• Provide assistance to the Allies to achieve a minimum level
of cyber defence and reduce vulnerabilities of national critical
infrastructures.
• Engage with partners, international organizations, the private
sector and academia.19

Table 2. Key Tenets of NATO Cyber Defence
Policy Versions.
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Year

Key Tenets of NATO Cyber Policy

2014

• Reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security
and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence.
• Recalls that the fundamental cyber defense responsibility of
NATO is to defend its own networks.
• Emphasizes responsibility of Allies to develop relevant capabilities for protection of their national networks.
• Recognizes that international law applies in cyberspace.
• Affirms that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense under Article 5.20

Table 2. Key Tenets of NATO Cyber Defence
Policy Versions. (cont.)
The 2014 NATO Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy
refines cyber governance processes and formerly ties
cyber to the traditional NATO core task of collective
defense. However, it also clarifies that NATO cyber
defense exists primarily to defend its own networks
and thus individual member countries are expected
to defend their own national networks. It also promulgates the view that international law applies to
cyberspace.21 The governance maintains the NAC is
the body that provides strategic-level oversight and
“exercises principal authority in cyber defence-related
crisis management.”22 Other key elements of NATO
cyber governance include:
The Cyber Defence Committee (formerly the Defence
Policy and PlanningCommittee/Cyber Defence), subordinate to the NAC, is the lead committee for political governance and cyber defence policy in general,
providing oversight and advice to Allied countries on
NATO’s cyber defence efforts at the expert level. At
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the working level, the NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB) is responsible for coordinating
cyber defence throughout NATO civilian and military
bodies. The CDMB comprises the leaders of the policy,
military, operational and technical bodies in NATO
with responsibilities for cyber defence.23

However, how would this governance process be
applied to determine the appropriate response to any
perceived aggression in cyberspace against NATO
or one of the Alliance members? According to Jason
Healey and Klara Tothova Jordan of the Atlantic
Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, “This process for
engagement begins at the technical level. If an incident has political implications, NATO’s cyber defense
efforts get elevated from the NCIRC to the CDMB
and CDC [Cyber Defence Committee] through to the
NAC.”24 The NAC would determine the appropriate
level of response, which could include invoking collective defense through Article 5 of the NATO Charter, although this is considered unlikely unless there
is significant physical damage or deaths involved.25
Within the constructs of international law, the NATO
charter, and the United Nations charter there remains
general ambiguity as to exactly how an incident in
cyberspace may be considered an act of war.26 If indeed the decision is made to pursue military action in
the cyberspace realm, what capabilities are available
within NATO forces to accomplish this?
NATO CYBERSPACE CAPABILITY: MILITARY
FOCUS
In a June 2013 blog article, General Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR),
promulgated the need for NATO forces to fully
9

embrace and integrate cyber defense into their operations. Noting that NATO had endured over 2,500 cyber attacks in its networks during 2012, he declared
the threat to be significant enough to drive upgrades
in incident response capability.
The idea is simple and as old as the alliance. Whether
the threat comes from the barrel of a gun or from a
high speed internet connection, you’re not alone when
your security is threatened. The destructive consequences of a cyber attack can be just as devastating as
the aftermath of a conventional attack and so we as a
military alliance must be prepared with appropriate
response options.27

Consistent with its current Cyber Defence Policy,
NATO’s top priority is to protect its own communications and information systems (CIS) that support
alliance military operations.28 NATO also has several
major supporting mission areas that include shared
situational awareness in cyberspace, critical infrastructure protection (CIP), critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP), counter-terrorism, support to
member countries cyber-capability development, and
response to crises related to cyberspace. To explore
these mission areas, let us examine the operations and
planning, doctrine and methods, and training and exercises related to NATO military cyberspace activities.
Operations and Planning.
As the NAC provides policy and strategic guidance, and NATO Headquarters committees provide
governance, Allied Command Operations (ACO) provides the planning and execution of all alliance operations. ACO operates at strategic, operational, and tac-
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tical levels to achieve its primary mission of ensuring
integrity of Alliance territory as well as supporting
missions that may require deployment outside this
area. Strategic level operations are directed within
the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) located in Mons, Belgium. Operational level
operations rely on standing Joint Force Commands in
Brunssum, the Netherlands (JFCBS) and in Naples, Italy (JFCNP) which operate in a similar manner as U.S.
joint forces in that they may conduct operations from
their permanent location or from a headquarters deployed to the theater of operations. Tactical level operations are directed by three domain-based commands:
Headquarters Allied Land Command (HQ LANDCOM) in Izmir, Turkey, Headquarters Allied Maritime
Command (HQ MARCOM) in Northwood, U.K., and
Headquarters Allied Air Command (HQ AIRCOM) in
Ramstein, Germany. Support of operational command
and control comes from the CIS Group headquartered
in Mons, Belgium, with signal battalions in Germany,
Italy, and Poland.29 The force structure is organized in
three broad categories, which are in decreasing order
of readiness level: in-place forces, deployable forces,
and long term build up forces.30
The organization of NATO cyber operations follows a similar paradigm. Strategic-level cyber defense and situational awareness occurs at ACO and
operational-level cyber activities occur at the JFCs,
tactical commands, and CIS Group. 31 Tactical-level
cyber situational awareness is primarily provided by
the NATO Communications and Information Agency
(NCI Agency), an agency established in July 2012 as
a merger of more than five separate NATO entities to
help achieve unity of effort.32 NCI Agency supports
routine daily ACO operations and during crisis response ACO prioritizes the NCI Agency efforts. While
11

the NCI Agency primary mission is to connect and
defend Alliance networks, it also assists NATO and
Partner Nations develop interoperable communication and information capabilities.33
To provide NATO with constant and integrated
cyber defense coverage, the NCI Agency operates
technical elements of the NCIRC.34 Initially envisioned
in the 2002 Prague Summit to be “the Alliance’s ‘first
responders’ to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber
incidents,”35 the NCIRC developed its initial capabilities between 2003 and 2006 and then continued to
evolve in both its capacity and capability.36 The term
“full operational capability (FOC)” has been applied
to the NCIRC in several contexts. For example, the
2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago summits pushed for
FOC by the end of 2012. As noted by one of the key
project managers, “‘full operational capability’ is perhaps a misnomer—cyberthreats are constantly evolving, and we [NATO] will never have a final or full
capability.”37 Capabilities have improved steadily as
the NCIRC FOC was implemented in planned increments.38 The FOC achieved in May 2014 at a cost of €58
million (U.S. $74.5 million) now provides improved
cyber protection of 55 NATO sites worldwide.39
Part of the NCIRC FOC Project was the establishment of a rapid reaction team (RRT) capability by the
end of 2012. The RRT capability consists of a permanent core of six cyber experts as well as national or
NATO experts in other areas unique to the specific
mission that can be formed to respond within 24 hours
of an incident.40 The RRT participates in NATO-sponsored exercises to hone the skills of its members and
to refine its procedures. The limited nature of the RRT
resources requires the team to work with industry
as well as with the Computer Emergency Response
Teams (CERTs) of affected nations.41
12

The NCIRC also has a staff-run Coordination Center, which coordinates cyber defense activities within
NATO as well as provides staff support to the CDMB
and liaison to external organizations, such as the European Union (EU).42 One area of such collaboration is
that of CIP, a challenge that is not limited to military
operations alone. As one cyber subject matter expert
at the NATO Joint Warfare Centre argues:
Some military professionals argue that protecting cyberspace where civilian infrastructure operates is a
civil matter, however, if an attack against infrastructure can affect the military operation, it has to be regarded in the Operational Planning Process.43

Certainly, NATO has made great strides in the area of
its own CIIP44 through such accomplishments as the
NCIRC FOC, but how can and should NATO cyber
operations support the more general threat of CIP?
In December 2012, the NATO Emerging Security
Challenges Division in Brussels sponsored a conference focused on NATO’s role in CIP. Findings of the
meeting included the recognition that NATO’s role
might necessitate many response capabilities for CIP
that involve such activities as disaster relief and antiterrorism perhaps coordinated with cyber defense.
However, the conference sponsor noted:
NATO cannot be the sole answer or panacea to many
of the challenges of critical infrastructure but the Alliance cannot afford to turn its back on them entirely if
it seeks to remain a relevant security organization in
the 21st century.45
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One of the key concerns noted by attendees was how
to define and prioritize the CIP assets among allies, as
well as how to include private business.46 These issues
can be addressed, in part, through the proper planning of military operations.
Traditional military planning requires inputs and
coordination amongst staff elements at the appropriate headquarters. For current cyberspace activities at
Headquarters NATO, coordination may involve staffs
of the J2 (Intelligence), J3 (Operations), J5 (Plans and
Policy), J6 (Consultation, Control and Communications), and J7 (Cooperation and Regional Security
Division) and activities at lower-level headquarters
will likely involve similar staff structures. One of the
greatest challenges for NATO is akin to that faced by
U.S. forces with regard to which staff element leads
the effort—that is, who’s in charge? Although no standard NATO organization structure for cyber defense
planning has been codified, common themes have
emerged from exercises. One recommendation is to
follow the traditional goal “to establish cross-functional staff entities to harness expertise for application
and focus to cyber problems.”47 It is also prudent to
develop concepts that mirror some traditional joint
task force staffs, such as a Cyber Defence Cell and Cyber Defence Working Group as vehicles to facilitate
coordination.48
When actually engaged in operations, a Joint Task
Force commander must try to maintain the necessary operations tempo despite cyber attacks aimed at
disrupting this objective. Thus, operational planning
should fully understand and appreciate the vulnerabilities as well as the enhancements that cyberspace
capabilities may present. As noted in the Joint Warfare
Centre Three Swords Magazine, “operationally-minded
decisions must prevail in determining how best to
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avoid, mitigate and prevent the consequences of cyber attacks on these vulnerabilities [that are caused by
operation’s cyber dependencies].”49
In addition to operational planning, NATO must
incorporate cyberspace requirements into its resource
planning process. In April 2012, cyber defense was
integrated into the NATO Defence Planning Process
(NDPP).50 To get the most from resource expenditures, NATO has introduced an initiative—Smart Defence—to leverage the sharing of capabilities in a time
of austerity. Put simply, “Smart Defence is a cooperative way of generating modern defence capabilities
that the Alliance needs, in a more cost-efficient, effective and coherent manner.”51 The initiative includes
projects for enhanced cyber defense. In April 2015, the
Portuguese Ministry of Defence hosted the first Cyber
Defence Smart Defence Projects’ Conference, which
included presentations on the three projects in work,
as well as sessions on cooperation with academia and
industry. The first project is the Malware Information
Sharing Platform (MISP), an initiative led by Belgium
to “facilitate information sharing of the technical characteristics of malware within a trusted community
without having to share details of an attack.”52 The
MISP capability was initially designed to support
NCIRC Technical Centre work but is now available to
all member countries.53
The second project, Multinational Cyber Defence
Capability Development (MN CD2), is an effort started in March 2013 and led by the Netherlands teamed
with Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Romania. The
project goal is to “cooperate on the development of:
improved means of sharing technical information;
shared awareness of threats and attacks; and advanced
cyber defence sensors”54 MN CD2 activities are managed in several work packages; the four initial work
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packages are Technical Information Sharing,55 Cyber
Defence Situational Awareness (CDSA),56 Distributed
Multi-sensor Collection and Correlation Infrastructure (DMCCI),57 Cyber Information and Incident Coordination System (CIICS) Enhancements.58 Two new
MN CD2 work packages were approved in June 2015:
CIICS Support Work Package and a Cyber Security
Assessment Team (CSAT) capability.59
The third project, Multinational Cyber Defence
Education and Training (MN CD E&T), helps to develop courses for cyber education programs, battle lab
support for training, and cyber range support for exercises to enhance professional development and certification of cyber defense personnel. Led by Portugal,
there are 11 NATO countries formally participating
with another 11 countries, as well as the EU, who are
interested; currently, the United States is not among
the group.60
Capabilities and lessons learned from these Smart
Defence programs are being applied to support the
broader Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) to enhance
interconnectivity and interoperability of Allied forces.
Together, these programs support the NATO Forces
2020 goal: “a coherent set of deployable, interoperable
and sustainable forces equipped, trained, exercised
and commanded to operate together and with partners in any environment.”61 Details of the CFI were
outlined in the 2014 NATO Wales Summit Declaration
and they include the large-scale (25,000 personnel)
exercise Trident Juncture.62 For this exercise, cyber
defense experts from the NATO Joint Warfare Centre
plan to practice skills and techniques that were refined
through the STEADFAST series of NATO exercises.63
What doctrine and methods form the basis for how
operators will perform in these exercises?
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Doctrine and Methods.
Allied Command Transformation (ATC) is one
of two strategic commands of NATO; together with
ACO they form the NATO Command Structure
(NCS). While ACO focuses on current operations,
ACT concentrates on transformation initiatives for
NATO military structure, forces, capabilities, and
doctrine. Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, ACT
directs three major units: the Joint Warfare Centre in
Stravanger, Norway; the Joint Force Training Centre
in Bydgoszcz, Poland; and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Monsanto, Portugal. Other
NATO education and training centers and Centres
of Excellence (COE) coordinate their activities with
ACT. 64
The only NATO accredited COE dedicated to cyberspace activities is the Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) located in Tallinn,
Estonia. The CCD COE was established in October
2008 via a Memorandum of Understanding amongst
seven NATO countries (Estonia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and Spain) with a
vision “to enhance cooperative cyber defence capabilities of NATO and NATO nations, thus improving the
Alliance’s interoperability in the field of cooperative
cyber defence.”65 Through its myriad endeavors, the
CCD COE supports NATO education, training, exercise, and research programs. These efforts include an
annual conference on Cyber Conflict first held in 2009;
numerous cyberspace-related workshops and short
courses addressing issues from tactical technical procedures up through national-level strategic planning;
annual dedicated cyber exercises first held in 2010 as
well as support to large-scale NATO exercises; and an
extensive on-line library.66
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Two other NATO-accredited COEs sponsor cyberrelated activities related to maritime operations and
defense against terrorism. The Combined Joint Operations From The Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE)
in Norfolk, Virginia, has an ongoing Maritime Cyber
Security project to “lead the development of a networked response to maritime cyber security threats
and challenges.”67 The center has produced white
papers on the cyber defense aspects of maritime operations and port security as well as the related legal implications.68 The Centre of Excellence Defence
Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara, Turkey, has
developed and delivered various courses and workshops regarding terrorist activities in cyberspace.69
The COE-DAT sponsored its first cyberspace-related
course, “Countering Cyber Terrorism,” in November
2006, which included participants from 18 countries (9
NATO and 9 non-NATO).70 The center’s most recent
courses include “Terrorist Use of Cyberspace” in May
201471 and “Critical Infrastructure Protection against
Terrorist Attacks” in November 2014;72 both courses
explored a diverse variety of cyberspace-related topics on the physical and virtual environments.
The state of doctrine development for cyberspace
operations is still in the formative stages. A search
through publicly available NATO Allied Joint Doctrine documents reveals an incomplete incorporation
of cyberspace activities. The capstone document for
Allied Joint doctrine, AJP-01 (December 2010), recognizes “cyber-operations” as an extension of traditional
NATO security challenges; highlights the increase in
reliance of Alliance operations on information systems and the resulting vulnerability to cyber attacks;
and depicts cyber operations as a subset of defensive
information operations.73 Even though it was published 4 months after the current AJP-01, the capstone
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document for communication and information systems doctrine, AJP-6 (April 2011), contains no explicit
mention of “cyber” or “cyberspace.” Instead, AJP-6
focuses on security aspects of communication and
information systems in the guise of “Information Assurance” designed to “to ensure the systems and networks employed to manage the critical information
used by an organization are reliable and secure, and
processes are in place to detect and counter malicious
activity.”74 The capstone document for operational
planning, AJP-5 (June 2013), includes cyberspace as a
functional area for planning on par with maritime, air,
space, and land. AJP-5 also places “defensive cyber
operations” amongst the means to help achieve coherence and synergy in the planning for joint targeting
and the employment of joint fires.75
For operational doctrine, the relevant capstone
document, AJP-3 (March 2011), has an inconsistent
incorporation of cyberspace. The publication initially
depicts cyberspace as a subset of the information environment, but later puts it on par with other joint
capabilities in the statement:
A joint operation endeavours to synchronize the employment and integration of the capabilities provided
by land, maritime, air, space, cyber space, special operations and other functional forces.76

AJP-3 maintains the perspective of cyberspace as
its own domain when describing the elements of a
Joint Force Commander’s establishing directive,77 but
then places it back under the information environment
in the description of The Operational Environment.78
Currently, there is no dedicated NATO doctrine for
cyberspace operations akin to the U.S. Joint Publication
3-12(R), Cyber Operations (October 2014); most of the
19

details of such activities are captured in AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations(November
2009). AJP-3.10 uses the nomenclature of computer
network operations (CNO) and computer network defense (CND) that was used in U.S. joint doctrine prior
to the release of JP 3-12(R).79 In efforts to improve this
situation, the NATO Joint Warfare Centre notes there
is ongoing work “to develop a JTF HQ SOP [standard
operating procedure] 218 for Cyber Defence, which
will likely serve to identify pre-doctrinal processes
and standard working methods before doctrine is in
place.”80 Also, the cyberspace doctrine is evolving
through lessons learned from various NATO exercises, as illustrated by the development of key planning products such as a Cyber Prioritized Asset List
(CPAL), Cyber Risk Assessment Matrix (CRAM), and
Warning Advice and Reporting Points (WARP).81
The continued development of cyberspace future
doctrine should consider not only military capabilities, but also those of industry as well considering that
the NCI Agency website states “80% of our [the NCI
Agency] work is done through contracts with national
Industries.”82 To facilitate enhanced relationships with
commercial cyberspace ventures, the NATO Industry
Cyber Partnership (NICP) was launched on September 17, 2014 at a 2-day conference in Mons, Belgium,
with 1,500 industry leaders and NATO policy makers.83 The key principle of the NICP initiative is that
the NCI Agency “will cooperate with the private sector for the primary purpose of reinforcing the protection of NATO’s own networks.”84 The NICP builds
upon existing cooperative efforts, such as guidelines
for information sharing at the technical level to enhance cyber security.85 Recent NICP accomplishments include the successful conclusion of the Cyber
Security Incubator Pilot Project in which:
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NATO, industry, and academic participants worked
together on defining challenges and investigating innovative solutions in the areas of big data and data fusion, cyber defence situational awareness, and mobile
security.86

Another recent NICP partnership is one between
the NCI Agency and Microsoft as part of the company’s Government Security Program (GSP) to “evaluate and protect existing systems and maintain more
secure infrastructure.”87
The Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) effort for 2013-2014 is a recent venture
involving many NATO countries designed to develop
and refine fundamental processes to integrate cyberspace operations into operational doctrine. As the
seventh iteration in a Multinational Experimentation
series that started in 2001, the theme for MCDC 20132014 was Combined Operational Access.88 Participants
from 19 countries focused “on the versatile, agile capabilities required to project combined forces into
an operational area with sufficient freedom of action
to accomplish the mission.”89 The project is divided
across seven Focus Areas, which included Cyber Implications for Combined Operational Access (CICOA).
This is an effort of 14 contributing countries led by Italy and Norway to “develop procedural and technical
solutions to facilitate the integration of cyber into the
operational planning process.”90 Tasks were separated
into two workstrands: one led by Norway to explore
“Operational Planning and the Cyber Domain” and
the other led by Italy to study “Cyber Capabilities
and Data Analysis.” Anticipated deliverables under
review include guidelines and a handbook to support joint operational planning processes, to include
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the ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). CICOA products also include guidelines
and taxonomy for data analyses that support cyber
situational awareness and threat assessment as part
of the intelligence process.91 The current program of
work for MCDC 2015-2016 includes a focus area on
Multinational Defensive Cyber Operations (MDCO)
led by the United States to build upon previous work
and “to develop a quicker way to effectively integrate
multinational forces to conduct defensive cyber operations” for the Multinational Force Commander.92
What are some practical means, short of actual crisis,
where doctrine and processes such as that produced
by the MCDC/CICOA undertaking can be learned,
applied, and perfected?
Education, Training and Exercises.
Cyberspace-related education and training occurs
at multiple levels throughout NATO. The NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, addresses cyber defense
issues at the strategic level, focusing on their broader
geopolitical implications. In December 2013, the College hosted a forum on “NATO and the Future of Cyber Security” designed to promote a dialogue within
NATO and the international security community.93
The College’s Research Division also publishes papers
on cyberspace topics, such as lessons learned from the
2007 Estonia attack, future threats, and doctrine development.94 The NATO School in Oberammergau,
Germany, currently provides six resident courses related to cyber and information operations at the operational level to support NATO staff officers and network security personnel.95 The NATO Joint Warfare
Centre provides training for joint and operational-
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level headquarters to include awareness and appreciation for the implications of cyberspace activities in
NATO operations.96 The NATO Communications and
Information Systems School (NCISS), which became
part of the NCI Agency in July 2012, provides five
cyber-related resident courses for CIS operators and
staff personnel. It also provides support to deployed
operations and subject matter expertise for exercises,
conferences, and workshops.97 The skills achieved by
personnel through education and training can be tested at the Cyber Range operated by Estonian Defence
Forces and adopted for NATO use in June 2014.98 The
Cyber Range capability provides an excellent foundation for NATO cyberspace-related exercises.
NATO approaches cyberspace-related exercises
in two broad categories—those specific to cyber operations and those integrated into existing exercises.99
The largest NATO cyber defense exercise is the “Cyber Coalition” series that has been conducted annually since 2008. Cyber Coalition 2014 involved “over 600
technical, government, and cyber experts operating
from dozens of locations from across the Alliance and
partner nations” as well as observers from academia
and industry. The exercise also served as a testbed
for the CIICS product from the Smart Defence initiative.100 Cyber Coalition 2014 also “provided a stage for
exercising strategic- and operational-level information sharing, senior-level decision making, and multidisciplined coordination in the cyber realm” amongst
26 Allied and five partner nations participating.101
The exercise control staff was hosted by the Estonian
National Defence College in Tartu, Estonia and utilized the newly adopted NATO Cyber Range there.102
Tartu also hosted Cyber Coalition 2013.103 It is interesting to note that Cyber Coalition 2012 was run concur-
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rently with the annual NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CMX), an internal command post exercise that
does not involve deployed forces.104
In addition to the Cyber Coalition exercises, the
CCD COE in Tallinn, Estonia, has sponsored the dedicated annual cyber exercise, Locked Shields, since
2010 (initially called Baltic Cyber Shield). Having
grown significantly over the years, Locked Shields
2015 involved 400 participants from 16 nations, and
was sponsored by a grant from the government of
Canada.105 The scenario included cyber attacks on the
fictitious country of Berlya, possibly by the rival nation of Crimsonia. It was, perhaps, a shrewd homage
to the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia typically attributed to Russia, but never proven conclusively.106 From
its outset, the Locked Shields exercises have involved
scenarios that include attacks on critical infrastructure.
The CCD COE keeps after action reports from the exercises in its publicly accessible website library.107
Bolstered in part by the new strategic direction for
NATO following the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the NATO
Joint Warfare Centre integrated cyber defense activities into their Steadfast Juncture 2011 exercise as
part of the initial effort to develop “across NATO’s
battlestaffs a comprehensive understanding of the
far reaching impacts of cyber attack.”108 To mirror the
complexity of real world cyberspace vulnerabilities,
the exercise designers injected cyber attacks into three
target categories: NATO command and control (e.g.,
computer networks); NATO operations (e.g., airports,
seaports, petroleum, electricity); and NATO mission
stability (e.g., energy, medical, financial, transportation, communication).109 Two years later, life imitated
the scenario as Steadfast Jazz 2013 participants experienced real-world cyber attacks during exercise
activities.110
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Cyber defense activities were also integrated into
the 2014 Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination eXercise (CWIX)
held at the Joint Forces Training Centre in Bydgoszcz,
Poland “to solve existing interoperability issues and
explore and share potential solutions in anticipation
of future operations and budget constraints.”111 The
cumulative lessons learned from cyber experience
in NATO exercises were used to inform the recent
Trident Juncture 2015 exercise (TRJE15), the largest
NATO exercise since 2002. The exercise was planned
to be conducted from October 3 to November 6, 2015
in Italy, Portugal, and Spain.112 As discussed earlier,
TRJE15 tested many of the concepts in the NATO
Smart Defence and Connected Forces Initiative to certify Joint Force Command Brunssum for command of
the NATO Response Force.113 Cyber experts from the
NATO Joint Warfare Centre published a series of seven recommendations specifically aimed at applying
cyber defense transformation measures gleaned from
the last four STEADFAST exercises to TRJE15.114 These
exercises test operational concepts and processes that
may be applied in contemporary situations within the
Alliance. What are the key issues related to the current NATO cyber policy that require the thoughtful
consideration of senior leaders?
KEY ISSUES FOR CURRENT POLICY
The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept represents a
renaissance of NATO core tasks. The new Enhanced
Cyber Defence Policy affirms the role that NATO cyber defense contributes to the mission of collective
defense and embraces the notion that a cyber attack
may lead to the invocation of Article 5 actions for the
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Alliance. Against this backdrop, this section examines
the related issues of offensive cyberspace, deterrence
in and through cyberspace, legal considerations, and
cooperation with the EU.
Offensive Cyberspace.
A significant “elephant in the room” issue for
NATO cyberspace operations is the possibility of any
use of offensive cyber by the Alliance. Cyber expert
James Lewis poses this challenge as: “The central question for NATO’s cyber doctrine is how the lack of an
articulated offensive cyber capability affects its ability to deter or defend.”115 In general, offensive cyberspace operations may be considered as the use of cyber capabilities outside of the defensive firewall of the
NATO network. Such operations could be conducted
in support of tactical activities by forces in the physical domains (e.g., land, sea, or air) or the operations
may be used as long-range strategic weapons directed
at the military and infrastructure of another nation.
The implications of the purposeful use of devastating
cyber methods against a foreign homeland bring up
allusions to the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, Lewis
asserts that there is a “cyber club” with NATO—the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France—that
possess not only nuclear weapons, but also an active
offensive cyberspace capability.116 Indeed, the United
States has officially incorporated offensive cyberspace
operations (OCO) in its publicly available joint doctrine in general terms, but details of any OCO implementation remain classified.117
In practical terms, NATO may already be entering the gray zone of developing active cyber defense
capabilities that go beyond the firewall to neutralize
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specific Internet nodes that are conducting attacks,
such as those that facilitated distributed denial of service actions experienced by Estonia in 2007. As one
NATO cyber officer noted, “NATO has established
a capable defence for most cyber threats, but that is
just the first step and what needs to quickly follow is
the development of ‘active defence’ capabilities.”118 In
implementing such measures, decision-makers must
recognize that whether acts of active cyber defense are
considered offensive is not up to the sender, rather the
receiver, because well-justified defensive acts may be
misinterpreted as aggression.119 However, if NATO
operations do evolve to embrace active cyber defense,
and then go further to adopt OCO in a manner similar
to that of nuclear weapons, the issue of political control of OCO release and use must be resolved first.120
Healey and Jordan assert that the focus should remain
on offensive coordination, not capability, and suggest
that NATO should create a group “with voluntary optin for states, modeled after NATO’s existing Nuclear
Planning Group, to discuss and map out an offensive
cyber policy.”121
Deterrence In and Through Cyberspace.
Closely related to the concept of OCO is what part
such a capability might play in the overall notion of
deterrence. Certainly, the NATO goal of achieving
deterrence with the Warsaw Pact through various
configurations of nuclear force planning has dominated much of both alliances’ early histories. In an
award-winning essay published in Joint Force Quarterly, Clorinda Trujillo surveyed existing scholarly
publications and compiled a proposed list of seven
cyberspace deterrent options, most of which do not
require OCO. Trujillo also noted the particular bar27

riers associated with any practice application of cyber
deterrence, such as the challenge of attribution as well
as the risk of unintentional outcomes where the use of
a cyber capability may itself result in further vulnerability.122
Deterrence theory usually includes the possibility
of an escalation of conflict and force between parties.
Traditional nuclear deterrence frameworks such as the
Kahn escalation ladder have been applied conceptually to circumstances that address not only cyber, but
also conventional and nuclear forces in the possible
scenarios.123 Potential misunderstanding of intentions
and actions coupled with imperfect situational awareness and lack of common language may facilitate escalation. In a NATO Defense College research paper,
Christine Hegenbart argues for the development of
precise and actionable linguistics to facilitate understanding of a cyber conflict escalation ladder that may
span a spectrum from hacktivism/cyber vandalism all
the way up to cyber war.124
Deterrence at an international level is most effective when it utilizes all instruments of power available to a country—diplomatic, information, military,
and economic. The United States may be the only
country with a publicly available declaratory deterrence statement as part of its International Strategy for
Cyberspace, as stated below:
When warranted, the United States will respond to
hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other
threat to our country. All states possess an inherent
right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain
hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under the commitments we have with our
military treaty partners. We reserve the right to use
all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, mili-
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tary, and economic—as appropriate and consistent
with applicable international law, in order to defend
our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.
In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military
force whenever we can; will carefully weigh the costs
and risks of action against the costs of inaction; and
will act in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international support whenever possible.125

Since the U.S. statement explicitly includes the
protection of allies, this implies inclusion of NATO
under the U.S. cyber deterrence umbrella. Even with
this theoretical protection, policy makers need to consider how to deal with nonstate actors that are heavily vested in the virtual realm (e.g., Anonymous and
LulzSec). Such groups may be impossible to deter
since they have “a different risk tolerance than those
acting in a physical domain due to their perceived
anonymity, invulnerability, and global flexibility.”126
Legal Considerations.
A continuing issue writ large within both NATO
and the global community involves how existing international law applies to activities in cyberspace.
From a security perspective, significant progress was
made with the publication of the Tallinn Manual on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare in 2013,
the culmination of a 3-year collaborative effort sponsored by the CCD COE.127 The Tallinn Manual was
preceded by the publication of International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations, an earlier study by the CCD
COE that includes case studies on four high-visibility
cyber attacks: Estonia 2007; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008; Lithuania 2008; and Georgia 2008.128
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The analytical framework within the Tallinn Manual
is based largely on the work of Michael Schmitt, but
it represents only one such model for evaluating the
severity level of cyber conflict.129 Perhaps not surprisingly, some non-NATO nations—Russia and China
in particular—do not fully agree with the principles
espoused within the Tallinn Manual. This is a significant challenge considering these countries are two of
the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council.130
Recognizing that the Tallinn Manual focuses on
cyber warfare amongst state actors at levels that comprise “armed attacks,” a CCD COE team is now working on how international law applies to less severe
malevolent activity in cyberspace. The effort known as
“Tallinn 2.0” looks at aggression below this threshold,
and publication of an updated Tallinn Manual is anticipated in 2016.131 In addition, the CCD COE continues to sponsor courses and workshops that facilitate
better understanding of legal issues related to cyber
conflict.132
NATO initiatives with the private sector, such as
NICP, present significant legal issues regarding the
status of the private contractors’ civilian employees
who support NATO operations. The implications
regarding their vulnerability to legitimate attack as
well as liability for due diligence remains under legal
evaluation.133
Cooperation with the European Union.
The 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration included a
call for NATO to work more closely with the EU in
the area of cyber defense.134 Indeed, of the 28 NATO
countries, all but Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway,
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Turkey, and the United States are members of the EU.
These countries share common interests in security
programs conducted by both organizations as well as
the desire not to have unnecessary duplication of resource contributions. Regarding cyber security, both
groups have similar goals, but different approaches,
as summed up by Piret Pernik of the International
Centre for Defence Studies in Estonia:
For both NATO and the EU, cyber security is a strategic issue that impacts the security and defence of
member states and of the organisations themselves.
They both prioritize the resilience and defence of their
own networks, organisations and missions, leaving
cyber security of individual members states a national
responsibility. The missions of the two organisations
are complementary, with NATO focusing on security
and defence aspects of cyber security, and the EU dealing with a broader, mainly non-military range of cyber
issues (Internet freedom and governance, online rights
and data protection), and internal security aspects.135

Previous NATO-sponsored studies have recommended improved cooperation between NATO and
the EU in such areas as critical infrastructure protection.136 However, unlike NATO, the EU does not provide direct technical support. Rather, it facilitates information sharing through such organizations as the
European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).137
Other significant differences between the two groups
is that the EU does not own its command and control
information systems and it lacks the central authority for common cyber security, such as that found in
the NAC.138
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In November 2014, the Council of the EU adopted
the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework to identify
priorities as well as roles and responsibilities related
to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy.139
Section five of the framework, “Enhancing cooperation with relevant international partners,” includes
a description of methods to improve EU and NATO
collaboration in cyberspace:
There is a political will in the EU to cooperate further
with NATO on cyber defence in developing robust
and resilient cyber defence capabilities as required
within this Policy Framework. Regular staff-to-staff
consultations, cross-briefings, as well as possible meetings between the Politico-Military Group and relevant
NATO committees, shall help to avoid unnecessary
duplication and ensure coherence and complementarity of efforts, in line with the existing framework of
cooperation with NATO.140

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This section summarizes the key findings from
the discussion of NATO cyberspace capabilities and
briefly examines how they apply to U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Army cyberspace activities
in Europe.
1. The NATO institutional embrace of cyberspace activities is similar to other forms of evolution that the Alliance
has undergone since its formation.
Aspects of the evolution of U.S. military cyberspace
goals parallel similar developments in NATO. U.S.
Cyber Command reached its full operational capability and U.S. Army Cyber Command was established
during the month before the Lisbon Summit’s call
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for an in-depth update of NATO cyber policy.141 This
policy was approved by NATO Defence Ministers in
June 2011, just a month before the release of the DoD
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.142 Most recently,
the endorsement of an enhanced NATO cyber policy
at the September 2014 Wales Summit was followed by
an updated DoD cyber strategy in April 2015.143
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has also
evolved to adopt cyber operations into its J6 staff element, officially named the Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4)/Cyber directorate.
Among its current priorities is “Operationalizing the
Joint Cyber Center capabilities (synchronization and
integration).” In his February 2015 testimony to Congress, the USEUCOM Commander, General Philip
Breedlove, noted two significant milestones for his
theater’s cyberspace capabilities:
EUCOM’s first Cyber Combat Mission Team (CMT)
and Cyber Protection Team (CPT) reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) this past year providing us
with new capabilities to protect our people, systems,
information, and infrastructure while holding adversaries at risk. As these teams continue to improve,
EUCOM will have an enhanced ability to plan and
conduct Cyberspace Operations to enhance our situational awareness and protect our cyber flank.144

U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) continues to support the changing requirements for not only USEUCOM, but U.S. Africa Command as well. In July 2014,
the 5th Signal Command opened the Gray Center
Cyber Operations Center in Wiesbaden, Germany.
The center is designed “to consolidate tactical, theater and strategic communications” for combatant
commanders and Army forces and it has a long-term
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goal “to take over cyberwatch responsibility from the
Stuttgart-based European Command.”145 Toward this
goal, the center includes a Theater Cyber Operations
Integration Center.
2. Despite a call at the 2010 Lisbon Summit to incorporate the cyber dimension into NATO doctrine, the process
has been slow and inconsistent. The relationship between
cyberspace and information operations in doctrine is unclear. The focus of NATO cyberspace in doctrine (formal
and de facto) is defensive and supportive in nature; this
appears to be by design since NATO has yet to adopt or
coordinate any position on the use of any offensive cyber
activity.
General Breedlove’s February 2015 testimony
to Congress discussed cyberspace operations and
information operations as distinct capabilities that
complement each other.146 The United States should
encourage NATO doctrinal development to follow the
current DoD model that distinguishes cyberspace operations from information operations in separate joint
publications (JP 3-12 and JP 3-13, respectively).
At the Service level, the Army is working to implement the joint doctrine structure through updates in
field manuals and related training. In September 2015,
the Army Cyber COE formalized this as an initiative
in its Strategic Plan: “Establish Foundational Doctrine
for Army Cyberspace Operations That Is Consistent
With Joint Doctrinal Tenets.” This initiative includes
the development of Field Manual (FM) 3-12, “Cyberspace Operations,” that will supersede FM 3-38, “Cyber Electromagnetic Activities.”147 During this transition period, the Army should continue to work with
NATO nations to share expertise on the evolving role
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of cyberspace activities. A good example of such cooperation is represented by the certificate of partnership signed in March 2015 by Major General Stephen,
Commanding General of the Army Cyber COE, and
Major General Heinrich-Wilhelm Steiner, Commander of the German Bundeswehr Communication and
Information Systems Command.148
3. The role of cyberspace activities in NATO deterrence
operations is not yet defined in any public forum.
As noted, NATO cyberspace forces do not have
offensive capabilities by design. Thus, some theorists
may argue that cyberspace operations cannot contribute to NATO deterrence. A recent Defense Science Board Task Force conducted a detailed study
“to review and make recommendations to improve
the resilience of DoD systems to cyber attacks,” and
the group’s final report offers several insights that
should be considered by NATO political and military
leaders.149 The Task Force report’s first recommendation is to “Protect the Nuclear Strike as a Deterrent
(for existing nuclear armed states and existential cyber attack),” which would be applicable to a limited
number of state actors that may pose a credible and
attributable high-tier threat.150 If adopted by NATO,
the schema could leverage the existing NATO nuclear
force structure to provide deterrence against existential-level cyber attacks.
Perhaps a more tempered and balanced approach
is offered by the same report’s second recommendation: “Determine the Mix of Cyber, Protected-Conventional, and Nuclear Capabilities Necessary for
Assured Operation in the Face of a Full-Spectrum
Adversary.”151 In contrast to the focus of the first rec-
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ommendation on the extreme end of the attack spectrum, the report asserts, “this strategy [of the second
recommendation] builds a real ladder of capabilities
and alleviates the need to protect all of our systems
to the highest level requirements.”152 As U.S. political
and military leadership wrestles with the methods
best suited to achieving deterrence using all forms of
national power—including cyberspace capabilities—
they should continue to factor in the deterrence provided indirectly to NATO.
4. Cyberspace presents the Alliance with complex and
interconnected challenges such as critical infrastructure
protection at the NATO and national level. Many nations
face further challenges in coordinating and integrating
their own internal whole-of-government approaches.
Certainly, the United States is among those nations
striving to develop and maintain a national cyberspace
defense that is coordinated across federal, state, and
local government. While self-interest is a necessity for
any sovereign country, there are areas of cyberspace
activity where prudent measures and harmonized actions work to the benefit of international security and
stability. Toward this end, the April 2015 Department
of Defense Cyber Strategy identifies Europe as a priority
region for partnership building and explicitly calls for
DoD to “work with key NATO allies to mitigate cyber
risks to DoD and U.S. national interests.”153
At the combatant command level, USEUCOM has
sponsored the annual Exercise Combined Endeavor
for 20 years as part of the U.S. investment in improved
regional C4 interoperability. The exercise is evolving
to integrate cyber defense into a shared mission network infrastructure that can accommodate a “bring
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your own device” environment.154 However, such exercises can only test capabilities developed and honed
well in advance. Cooperation among partner nations
is enhanced through opportunities such as the July
2015 Cyber Summit sponsored by USAREUR, which
had a theme that discussed “how to protect critical
networks and infrastructure, but still achieve interoperability with allies in the cyber domain.”155
5. NATO has established robust education, training,
and exercise programs that include dedicated cyber exercises as well as ones integrated into large-scale exercises
addressing both the political and military aspects of crisis
management.
A thorough education, training, and exercise program for cyberspace should address people and programs at all levels within NATO. At the garrison level,
USAREUR has an excellent awareness and training
program, available on their public website, that addresses information assurance aspects of cyber security as well as operational security and force protection.156 The repository includes a superb presentation
on “The Cyber Attack Cycle” that discusses the sevenstep process of most cyber attacks developed by the
Army Provost Marshal General in collaboration with
the Army Cyber Command.157
With a solid foundation at the unit level, USAREUR
forces also work to establish tactical-level interoperability through events such as the annual “Stoney Run”
exercise between the Bravo Company, 44th Expeditionary Signal Battalion and the 250 Gurkha Signal
Battalion. Lessons learned from NATO support of the
Afghan Mission Network have been applied to develop the Army Coalition Mission Environment, which
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will be integrated into the Steadfast Cobalt 15 exercise
in Poland. Cooperative efforts between the USAREUR
102nd Signal Battalion and the 282nd Bundeswehr
Command Support Battalion strive to work out cultural challenges amongst partner nations resulting
from differences in language, planning cycles, and
societal values.158
At the NATO operational level, USEUCOM conducts exercises such as Combined Endeavor 2014,
which involved 30 nations and three international
organizations that spent “three weeks training, operating, and configuring to a common securable
standard.”159 In addition to large-scale exercises,
USEUCOM also supports the education of key leaders within NATO. In December 2014, the George C.
Marshall Center in Garmish-Partenkirchen, Germany
conducted its inaugural Program on Cyber Security
Studies with 67 participants from 47 countries. These
attendees all had “professional knowledge and capabilities to deal with transnational cyber security
challenges” and the course material was “tailored for
senior officials responsible for developing or influencing cyber legislation, policies or practices in their
countries.” As part of the agenda, the USEUCOM/J6,
Brigadier General Welton Chase Jr. “discussed mutual
training opportunities and exercises to enhance cyber
capabilities, interoperability and resiliency.”160
6. NATO has done well to include industry, partner
countries, and organizations such as the EU in many of
their cyber-related activities.
To help promulgate partnerships beyond militaryto-military venues, USEUCOM developed Cyber
Endeavor as its “paramount cyber security collabora-
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tion, familiarization, and engagement program” that
includes participation by academia and industry.161
Cyber Endeavor began in 2009, and it is comprised of
a series of regional seminars held in different countries with speakers from the military, academia, and
companies such as Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Cisco,
and Verizon. Cyber Endeavor 2014 held seminars in
three NATO countries: the Czech Republic, focused
on configuration management; Bulgaria, focused on
vulnerability management; and Romania, focused
on boundary defense. The 2014 program culminated
with a capstone seminar in Grafenwöhr, Germany,
held concurrently with exercise Combined Endeavor,
but separate from its activities. The capstone agenda
was split equally into two major elements, with one
half comprised of presentation and discussions on the
latest trends in cyberspace activities and the other half
concentrated on hands-on training.162
7. NATO cyber activities have provided smaller countries with unique leadership roles within the Alliance.
In general, U.S. engagement with smaller NATO
countries on cyberspace issues has been positive and
encouraging. As noted earlier, Cyber Endeavor seminars have been conducted in smaller NATO countries
as well as Partnership for Peace countries, such as
Montenegro.163 The USEUCOM International Cyber
Engagement team recognized the opportunity to leverage existing programs, such as the State Partnership Program, to involve National Guard units in the
development of cyber capabilities of specific nations.
One example is the coordination with the Albania J6
staff and the New Jersey National Guard in May 2012
that followed a successful Cyber Endeavor seminar in
Tirana in March of that year.164
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There have been occasions when the United States
has been slower to participate in new NATO cyberspace undertakings led by smaller countries. For example, the United States did not join the CCD COE
until November 2011, more than 3 years after its
founding in Estonia.165 In addition, there was no active U.S. participation in the MCDC 2013-2014 CICOA
cyberspace initiative, although as noted earlier, the
United States has taken a lead role in the MCDC 20152016 MDCO initiative.166 While it may not always be
possible or prudent to have U.S. leadership in every
area of NATO cyberspace programs, it is advisable
for USEUCOM and USAREUR leadership to evaluate
and prioritize future NATO engagement opportunities promptly.
8. NATO has taken a lead role on a global scale in establishing standards for legal evaluation of activities in
cyberspace.
The United States had an active role in the development and review of the original Tallinn Manual,
with Professor Michael Schmitt of the Naval War College serving as Director of The International Group of
Experts. The U.S. participation included an observer
from U.S. Cyber Command and reviewers from the
Naval Postgraduate School and the U.S. Military
Academy.167 Representatives of the Naval War College also provide lectures as part of the law courses
offered by the CCD COE.
The review of contemporary legal issues related
to cyberspace continues to be addressed in several
Service-specific journals such as the U.S. Naval War
College International Law Studies168 and The Air Force
Law Review.169 Also, The Army Cyber Institute at West
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Point and U.S. Marine Force Cyberspace Command
jointly produce The Cyber Defense Review to serve “as
the leading online and print journal for issues related to cyber for military, industry, professional and
academic scholars, practitioners and operators” that
addresses topics of law, ethics, and policy as well as
strategy, operations, tactics, and history.170
9. Cyberspace efforts must compete for resources with
other operations and initiatives within NATO.
Simply put, cyberspace activities are not the number one priority for NATO, and perhaps not even in
the top ten. In his May 2015 assessment of the Wales
Summit, European expert Dr. John Deni argues that
one of the key obstacles facing the NATO refocus on
core missions is “the imbalance between an increasing
number of missions and stagnating resources.”171 He
further warns that in such a constrained fiscal environment, “the clear risk here is that NATO may overcommit and over-extend itself” in the pursuit of six
new initiatives which do not include existing efforts in
cyber security as well as those in energy and environmental security.172
Indeed, in his March 2013 testimony to Congress,
former SACEUR and USEUCOM commander Admiral James Stavridis listed cyberspace as only one of
six transnational threats, which, in turn, collectively
comprised the fourth of his six theater priorities for
USEUCOM.173 The current SACEUR, General Philip
Breedlove, in his 2014 article “The New NATO” listed
cyber security challenges in a group of “also need to
consider threats” toward the end of the discussion.174
This is not to imply that cyberspace capabilities are
not important to NATO. Rather, it is to acknowledge
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the numerous competing tasks facing the Alliance as
it continues to evolve in a complex and dynamic international environment.
The realm of cyberspace itself will continue to
change, as will the myriad actors that operate in and
through it for purposes related to all instruments of
power. NATO cyberspace activities face many challenges that must be assessed and prioritized on a
recurring basis by policymakers. While there will
always be room for improvement, the overall state
of cyberspace activities within NATO appears to be
sound. The continued resourcing for, and pursuit of,
improved cyberspace capabilities by U.S. military
forces in Europe will help to ensure the steady progress of NATO cyberspace endeavors.
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF CYBER-RELATED MATERIAL
IN DECLARATIONS FROM RECENT NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETINGS
NATO North
Atlantic Council
Meeting

Key Cyberspace-Related Text in Summit Declaration

4. Effective military forces, an essential part of our overall political strategy,
Prague, Czech
are vital to safeguard the freedom and security of our populations and
Republic
to contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. We have
November 21, 2002 therefore decided to:
f. Strengthen our capabilities to defend against cyber attacks.1
Istanbul, Turkey
June 28, 2004

No mention of cyber in declaration.

Brussels, Belgium
February 25, 2005

No mention of cyber in declaration.

The adaptation of our forces must continue. We have endorsed a set of
initiatives to increase the capacity of our forces to address contemporary
threats and challenges. These include:
Riga, Latvia
• work to develop a NATO Network Enabled Capability to share informaNovember 29, 2006
tion, data and intelligence reliably, securely and without delay in Alliance operations, while improving protection of our key information
systems against cyber attack2
47. NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information
systems against cyber attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy on Cyber
Defence, and are developing the structures and authorities to carry it out.
Bucharest, Hungary Our Policy on Cyber Defence emphasises the need for NATO and nations
April 3, 2008
to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective
responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist
Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. We look forward
to continuing the development of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities and
strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities.3
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NATO North
Atlantic Council
Meeting

Key Cyberspace-Related Text in Summit Declaration

Strasbourg-Kehl,
France/Germany
April 2-3, 2009

49. We remain committed to strengthening communication and information
systems that are of critical importance to the Alliance against cyber attacks,
as state and non-state actors may try to exploit the Alliance’s and Allies’
growing reliance on these systems. To prevent and respond to such attacks,
in line with our agreed Policy on Cyber Defence, we have established
a NATO Cyber Defence Management Authority, improved the existing
Computer Incident Response Capability, and activated the Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. We will accelerate our cyber
defence capabilities in order to achieve full readiness. Cyber defence is being
made an integral part of NATO exercises. We are further strengthening the
linkages between NATO and Partner countries on protection against cyber
attacks. In this vein, we have developed a framework for cooperation on
cyber defence between NATO and Partner countries, and acknowledge the
need to cooperate with international organisations, as appropriate.4

40. Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and evolving in sophistication. In
order to ensure NATO’s permanent and unfettered access to cyberspace
and integrity of its critical systems, we will take into account the cyber
dimension of modern conflicts in NATO’s doctrine and improve its
capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, defend and recover in case of a cyber
attack against systems of critical importance to the Alliance. We will strive
in particular to accelerate NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
(NCIRC) to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012 and the bringing of
Lisbon, Portugal
all NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection. We will use NATO’s
November 20, 2010 defence planning processes in order to promote the development of Allies’
cyber defence capabilities, to assist individual Allies upon request, and to
optimise information sharing, collaboration and interoperability. To address
the security risks emanating from cyberspace, we will work closely with
other actors, such as the UN and the EU, as agreed. We have tasked the
Council to develop, drawing notably on existing international structures
and on the basis of a review of our current policy, a NATO in-depth
cyber defence policy by June 2011 and to prepare an action plan for its
implementation.5
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NATO North
Atlantic Council
Meeting

Key Cyberspace-Related Text in Summit Declaration

Chicago, Illinois,
USA
May 20, 2012

49. Cyber attacks continue to increase significantly in number and
evolve in sophistication and complexity. We reaffirm the cyber defence
commitments made at the Lisbon Summit. Following Lisbon, last year
we adopted a Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and Action Plan, which [is]
now being implemented. Building on NATO’s existing capabilities, the
critical elements of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability
(NCIRC) Full Operational Capability (FOC), including protection of most
sites and users, will be in place by the end of 2012. We have committed
to provide the resources and complete the necessary reforms to bring all
NATO bodies under centralised cyber protection, to ensure that enhanced
cyber defence capabilities protect our collective investment in NATO. We
will further integrate cyber defence measures into Alliance structures and
procedures and, as individual nations, we remain committed to identifying
and delivering national cyber defence capabilities that strengthen Alliance
collaboration and interoperability, including through NATO defence planning
processes. We will develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend
against, and recover from cyber attacks. To address the cyber security
threats and to improve our common security, we are committed to engage
with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with international
organisations, inter alia the EU, as agreed, the Council of Europe, the UN
and the OSCE, in order to increase concrete cooperation. We will also take
full advantage of the expertise offered by the Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence in Estonia.6
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NATO North
Atlantic Council
Meeting

Key Cyberspace-Related Text in Summit Declaration

Newport, Wales,
UK
September 5, 2014

72. As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber threats and attacks will
continue to become more common, sophisticated, and potentially
damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we have endorsed an Enhanced
Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of the Alliance’s core
tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security
and of prevention, detection, resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls that
the fundamental cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own
networks, and that assistance to Allies should be addressed in accordance
with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of Allies to
develop the relevant capabilities for the protection of national networks.
Our policy also recognises that international law, including international
humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks
can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity,
security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies
as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of
NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack
would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic
Council on a case-by-case basis.
73. We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence
capabilities, and we will enhance the cyber security of national networks
upon which NATO depends for its core tasks, in order to help make the
Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral and multinational
cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities
of the Alliance. We will continue to integrate cyber defence into NATO
operations and operational and contingency planning, and enhance
information sharing and situational awareness among Allies. Strong
partnerships play a key role in addressing cyber threats and risks. We will
therefore continue to engage actively on cyber issues with relevant partner
nations on a case-by-case basis and with other international organisations,
including the EU, as agreed, and will intensify our cooperation with industry
through a NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. Technological innovations and
expertise from the private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allies to
achieve the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy’s objectives. We will improve
the level of NATO’s cyber defence education, training, and exercise activities.
We will develop the NATO cyber range capability, building, as a first step,
on the Estonian cyber range capability, while taking into consideration the
capabilities and requirements of the NATO CIS School and other NATO
training and education bodies.7
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